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Abstract
I present a simple and precise relationship between the willingness-to-pay and the willingness-to-accept, or
equivalently between the compensating and equivalent variations following an exogenous welfare change. One
can be computed given the other as a function of income.
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1 . Introduction
Differences between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) have been widely
acknowledged in the empirical literature, where a persistent discrepancy in the two welfare measures
1is noted. On the normative side, progress has been made in bounding the difference between WTA
and WTP. The equivalent and compensating variation (denoted by E and C) are the welfare measures
in standard demand theory (Hicks, 1939) that directly correspond to WTA and WTP. Willig (1976)
noted that the difference between the two is likely to be small if the change in welfare is due to a price
change of a market commodity. However, based on results by Randall and Stoll (1980), Hanemann
(1991) shows that when the welfare change is induced by varying a nonmarket public good q, then
differences between C and E can be arbitrarily large (infinite in the limit), depending on the degree of
substitutability between q and the other ordinary market commodities. He restates the bounds on the
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difference obtained by Randall and Stoll in terms of elasticities, making plain the separate influence of
substitution and income effect, each accounting for a portion of the deviation.
In this paper, I derive an explicit relation between C and E that holds for a large class of utility
maximization problems. The idea is that, given a certain reference variation in the level of the
ˆ
ˆnonmarket good, the induced equivalent variation E at an income level y5 y2C, reduced by the
compensating variation, is equal to C. And this identity holds over the whole range of incomes, so that
one welfare measure can be recovered from the other by the fundamental theorem of calculus. The
obtained identity between compensating and equivalent variation allows bounding the difference,
E2C5WTA2WTP, if limits on the changes of one welfare measure are available, for instance
through direct computation or observation.
2 . Preliminaries
Suppose there are n$ 1 conventional market goods x , . . . ,x and one nonmarket good q. Let the1 n
consumer’s preferences over the consumption of these goods be strictly convex, and represented by
2 n11the increasing and strictly quasiconcave utility function, u:R →R. In addition, to simplify the
ensuing analysis, assume that u5 u(x,q) is sufficiently smooth. Given a vector p4 0 whose
components represent prices for the respective market commodities, the consumer tries to find the
n*optimal Hicksian commodity bundle x in R , subject to her finite income y$ 0. The classical utility1
maximization problem is given by
maxu(x,q), subject to p ? x5 y. (1)
x$0
*Because of the continuity of u there exists an optimal solution, x , to the utility maximization
problem Eq. (1), the components of which are described by the following Hicksian demand functions
i*x 5 h (p,q,y), i5 1, . . . ,n.i
The resulting indirect utility is defined as v(p,q,y)5 u(h(p,q,y),q). Note that the indirect utility is
3
strictly increasing in income, so that for any (p,q)4 0,
0 1 0 1y , y ⇒ v(p,q,y ), v(p,q,y ). (2)
0 1To value a change in the provision of the nonmarket good q from q to q we define the compensating
variation C(p,y) and equivalent variation E(p,y) by
1 0v(p,q ,y2C(p,y)) 5 v(p,q ,y), (3)
1 0v(p,q ,y) 5 v(p,q ,y1E(p,y)). (4)
2Strict quasiconcavity is required only with respect to the conventional market goods x to guarantee the existence of a
unique solution to the utility maximization problem (1).
3This result holds under weaker conditions on u (only continuity and local nonsatiation of the underlying preferences are
required, cf. Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 56)).
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1 0Without loss of generality we assume q . q . The term C(p,y) is the income that a consumer would
1
need to be compensated with in order to be indifferent between the higher level q and the current
0 1level q . If the consumer is endowed with q , then E(p,y) is the income that yields equivalent utility
0to her as consuming at the lower level q . In other words, C corresponds to the WTP, and E to the
WTA for the proposed welfare change.
Proposition 1. The willingness to pay, C(p,y)[ [0,y], and the willingness to accept, E(p,y)[ [0,`),
0 1for the welfare change from q to q exist, and are uniquely determined by Eqs. (3) and (4),
respectively.
*Proof. For any (p,q,y)$ 0 there is a unique x 5 h(p,q,y) that solves the maximization problem Eq.
(1). We obtain thus
1 0 1v(p,q ,y2 0)$ v(p,q ,y)$ v(p,q ,y2 y),
so that by continuity of v(p,q, ? ) there exists a C(p,y)[ [0,y] that solves Eq. (3). It is unique, since
the LHS of Eq. (3) is strictly monotone in C. The existence of E(p,y) follows from a similar analysis
of Eq. (4). Note first,
0 1 0limv(p,q ,y1l)$ v(p,q ,y)$ v(p,q ,y1 0).
l→`
Hence, a solution to Eq. (4) exists and must be unique by virtue of the strict monotonicity of
0v(p,q ,y) in y. h
3 . Main result
ˆLet C(p,y)[ [0,y] be the unique solution of Eq. (3) and set y5 y2C(p,y). Then the willingness to
ˆ
ˆaccept, E, at the reduced budget y # y can be determined using Eq. (4),
1 0
ˆ
ˆ ˆv(p,q ,y )5 v(p,q ,y 1E ).
Equivalently stated,
1 0
ˆv(p,q ,y2C(p,y))5 v(p,q ,y2C(p,y)1E ),
0 0
ˆso that Eq. (3), together with the injectivity of v(p,q , ? ) (since ≠ v(p,q ,y). 0), implies E5C. Iny
other words E(p,y2C(p,y))5C(p,y) for all y$ 0. Differentiating the last identity with respect to y,
we obtain
≠ C(p,y)y
]]]]≠ E(p,y2C(p,y))5 . (5)y 12≠ C(p,y)y
Note, by differentiating Eq. (3) with respect to y and using the envelope theorem we find
0 10,≠ v(p,q ,y)5 (12≠ C(p,y))≠ v(p,q ,y2C(p,y)),y y y
314 T.A. Weber / Economics Letters 80 (2003) 311–315
ˆso that ≠ C(p,y), 1 for all y$ 0. Hence, the relation y5 y2C(p,y) is strictly monotonicallyy
ˆincreasing in y and we define its inverse by f(p,y )5 y. Naturally f(p, ? ) is continuous and strictly
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆincreasing and with Eq. (5) it is ≠ E(p,y )5≠ C(p, f(p,y )) /(12≠ C(p, f(p,y ))) for all y $ 0. Sincey y y
4E(p,y) can be written, using the fundamental theorem of calculus as
y
E(p,y)5E(p,y2C(p,y))1E ≠ E(p,j ) dj,y
y2C(p, y)
we obtain the main result by a simple change of variables.
Theorem 1. Let (p,y)$ 0. The willingness to accept is related to the willingness to pay by
y ≠ C(p, f(p,j ))y
]]]]]]E(p,y)5C(p,y)1E dj, (6)12≠ C(p, f(p,j ))y2C(p, y) y
n11
where f :R →R , with f(p,j )5 y:j 5 y2C(p,y) , is a continuous single-valued function.h j1 1
As a direct consequence of the first mean-value theorem in integral calculus we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. There exists a constant m(p,y)[ m,M , such thatf g
E(p,y)5 (11m(p,y))C(p,y),
where m5m(p,y) and M5M(p,y) are the infimum and supremum of the set
≠ C(p, f(p,j ))y
]]]]]]+(p,y)5 :j [ ( y2C(p,y),y)H J12≠ C(p, f(p,j ))y
respectively.
Corollary 2. (i) If E(p,y) is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in y, then E(p,y)$ (# )C(p,y).
(ii) If C(p,y) is increasing (decreasing) in y, then C(p,y)# ($ )E(p,y).
The dual relation to Eq. (6), formulated below, expressing C(p,y) as a function of E(p,y) can be
obtained in a manner completely analogous to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. The willingness to pay is related to the willingness to accept by
y1E(p, y) ≠ E(p,g(p,j ))y
]]]]]]C(p,y)5E(p,y)2E dj, (7)11≠ E(p,g(p,j ))y y
n11
where g:R →R , with g(p,j )5 y:j 5 y1E(p,y) , is a continuous single-valued function.h j1 1
4See Rudin (1976, p. 134).
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4 . Discussion
The obtained relation between the equivalent and compensating variation directly relates WTA and
WTP, so that from a normative viewpoint the question of which one is greater is resolved by
determining the sign of the integral in either Eqs. (6) or (7). In addition, the difference between the
two can be bounded, if the concrete problem at hand allows specifying limits on the slope of either C
or E. The exact relation can help avoid solving the dual problem to Eq. (1), when the sole objective is
to obtain a bound on the difference or obtain one welfare measure from the other. Furthermore, Eqs.
(6) and (7) may be useful as an alternative way of measuring the difference between WTA and WTP
by estimating the slope of either compensating or equivalent variation over the relevant income
interval.
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